Overreach: The Inside Story of Putin and Russia’s War Against Ukraine

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Part II - Warpath - prelude to the invasion, including section devoted to was the military movements a bluff or the real thing? Matthews’ focus on the major Russian non-Putin characters makes Chapter 4 and 5 the best and most interesting parts of the book. Matthews describes Surkov as “the most paradoxical and fascinating figure ever to have worked in Putin’s Kremlin”, and makes his case well. The portrait of Patrushev is also helpful for introducing readers to an essential figure in Russia’s recent past, the current war, and possibly the future too. The first section of Chapter 5 deserves a book of its own (perhaps by Matthews, perhaps by Mark Galeotti, whose work Matthews draws on) charting the long, agonising decline of the so-called “liberals” in the Kremlin, from Yegor Gaidar to Surkov, as they consistently failed to deliver the results that successive Russian leaders wanted. The author briefly goes over some key battles such as the one for the Hostomel airport. However, there are few details about other major battles such as the siege of Mariupol and Azovstal. The war crimes at Bucha are covered in more detail including the story of the young Russian soldier that committed war crimes and was subsequently captured and sentenced to life in prison. Various actors in the war such as the foreign volunteers, the Chechens, the Wagner mercenaries are each discussed in turn. Then comes the invasion. Mistakes were made; opportunities missed, by both Russia and the West. Matthews presents a nuanced portrait of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle—a depiction that defies caricature and avoids the clichés often associated with the Russian leader. He uncovers the simple truth: there is less to Putin than meets the eye. Putin’s affinity for power is coupled with a devastating habit of overestimating his own abilities.

This is well worth reading giving a brief but very informative history of Ukraine along with more detail on Ukraine since independence and the current war. It was well written, so easy to read without being too simplistic, and I learned some new facts from it, which makes a non-fiction book worth reading for me. First, and foremost in the minds of Putin's entourage was the conviction that by the end of 2021 the jeopardy from Western influence in Ukraine and Russia had become too threatening to ignore - and all attempts to control it by meddling in Ukraine politics failed. Thus did Putin fall in with the Orthodox Church-influenced Far Right, who see Mother Russia as the last bastion of traditional Christian values. We meet zealots like Alexander Dugin, a white-bearded Soviet-era intellectual who is a kind of anti-Vaclav Havel, quoting Heidegger as he rails against godless Western liberalism. And we tune into religious broadcasting like Tsargrad TV – Orthodoxy’s answer to Fox News – where moral rot is blamed on gays and human rights busybodies funded by George Soros. The invasion, says Matthews, was “the final triumph of an elderly Russia over a young one, of paranoid Soviet-minded conspiracy theorists over... post-Soviet practical capitalists.”This chapter discusses a selection of topics and people current in 2015. Three people were influential with the Kremlin: the far-right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, the ultranationalist Christian oligarch Konstantin Malfeev and the PR media monk Metropolitan Tikhon. Other people include Sergei Glazyev, who linked Orthodox ultra-nationalism to the Kremlin and PR guru Vladislav Surkov. Topics include Gazprom and the weaponising of Russian gas, and Russia’s war in Syria. In Ukraine, mention is made of the actor and future president, Volodymr Zelensky and the Oligarch and former president Proshenko. Nor, in a country that still suffers an “addiction to imperial fantasies”, is it likely that Putin’s replacement will be Gorbachev 2.0. Nationalism, Matthews says, is a far more powerful current in Russia than pro-Western liberalism. He adds: “A military defeat at the hands of NATO weaponry would likely strengthen, not weaken, that tendency.” As with all books published in the midst of war this book is already somewhat out of date. Matthews records events up to the end of September 2022. So the Kharkiv offensive of that month is covered but the Russian retreat from Kherson is not. Nor is the Russian offensive around Bakhmut in the winter of 22/23.

The title refers to Putin’s hubris in launching the Ukraine invasion, yet this book is much more, charting how the dream of reclaiming Moscow’s old empire went from “the marginal fringes of Russian politics to become official Kremlin policy”.On 23rd February 2022, the day before the Russian invasion, the author provides short snapshots of the situation and expectations of people in various places: Moscow, Kyiv, Belgorod Russia, Moscow, Kherson Ukraine, and Oxfordshire UK, Mariupol Ukraine and Bucha Ukraine.