Johnson at 10: The Inside Story: The Bestselling Political Biography of the Year

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This is hardly the first book about Johnson, with plenty of ink being spilled over the politician’s tumultuous childhood and his rise to power, and indeed his downfall. Johnson at 10 wisely summarises the other accounts of his early life, and focuses instead on the psychodrama of his time at the top. This book is a remarkable achievement in political analysis and weaving a comprehensive narrative of Johnson's premiership, which was perhaps one of the most convoluted times in British history. Every section and topic covered had its own breathing room within the chapters, covering the same time period with different perspectives. Richly detailed and impeccably researched, the narrative was woven creatively and analytically without getting bogged down in unnecessary jargon. The problematic power struggles between Cummings, Sunak, Javid and his personal advisers were all laid bare with excellent clarity, and the eventual - inevitable - fall was told with a keen interest in mind. Boris Johnson has never made any secret of his admiration for Winston Churchill or discouraged comparisons between himself and his predecessor as prime minister. Yet a better parallel, argue Anthony Seldon and Raymond Newell in their account of Johnson’s time in office, is David Lloyd George.

The third is a moment in which Seldon and Newell analyse one of the elements in Johnson’s downfall. This is what they say: This mirthless farce had tragic real-world consequences. Utterly unsuited to handling a crisis as grave as the pandemic, his endless prevarications and about-turns cost lives. “He wildly oscillated in what he thought,” observes one official. “In one day he would have three meetings in which he would say three completely different things depending on who was present, and then deny that he had changed his position.” His personal brush with Covid encouraged some to think it might prompt a reform of his behaviour. They were disappointed. Even coming near to death couldn’t remedy character flaws that were so deeply ingrained. BJ was brilliant at feigning ignorance, sometimes to hide when he actually was ignorant. In Sept 2020, when discussing the trade deal, it was starting to dawn on BJ what leaving the customs union meant. “No no Frosty, what happens with a deal?”. Frost replies “PM this is what happens with a deal, that’s what leaving the customs union means”. (A side point, only in 1820 did the US realise that leaving the British empire was beneficial (they left in 1776)). Who knows, Brexit could be beneficial in 50 years? BJ, as written earlier was a very good chair of meetings when he wanted to. At the G7, he had not read his briefing papers, but still managed to survive and almost thrive.

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He lied about Brexit. In particular he was happy to sacrifice the Good Friday Agreement, international treaties and mislead the Queen without ever having an oven ready plan for Brexit or the skills or ability to make one. Reading this is a sad experience. This is not to make a political point but to reflect how far Boris Johnson's tenure in 10 Downing Street fell short of the demands of office, which is why he fell so spectacularly from power after only three years. Why would a previously serving Foreign Secretary ask civil servants to write him a 3,000-word essay on what his foreign policy should be as PM, when he had previously served in the role under Theresa May?

This is already long enough, but I was interested in personal glimpses of two people who I know a little and a third who I am fascinated by. I knew Martin Reynolds, the Principal Private Secretary to Johnson, when he was a mid-level diplomat in Brussels fifteen years ago. He is more capable than most officials, but was nonetheless out of his depth in the sheer awfulness of trying to manage the Johnson system. On the other hand, John Bew, Johnson’s main foreign policy advisor, is one of the few people to come out of the book looking good; he gave sound advice and wrote a substantive paper on UK global strategy post-Brexit. His father was a colleague of my father’s; I last saw John when he was about ten years old, and I’m glad he is doing well. Well,” he says, “this is the reason why for the moment Starmer is disappointing, because there is this enormous desire for renewal. But Starmer seems micro when he could be macro, cautious when he could be passionate, dull where he could be inspirational.” We would like to thank Isaac Farnworth and John Paton, but cannot for the life of us remember what you did to help. Of his time in the Foreign Office, the book says: “Johnson had forged some important personal relationships that were to bear fruit later, but had learned little of value as foreign secretary about leadership to take forward with him into Downing Street, least of all about the kind of people on whom he would have to rely, and about how to define strategy then to deliver it.” This, we are told, was a “squandered opportunity that was to cost him dear”.

Johnson was clearly a man unfit to govern. He was lazy; his attention was spasmodic; he chose to be surrounded by people who would not challenge him; he was unable to make decisions effectively; he was often torn between what Carrie, his wife, would say, what his advisers were advising and what he felt ought to be done; he did not cultivate his MPs; his inclinations were at odds with the influential (and obstinate) Conservative right-wingers; he was a liar, arrogantly self-confident, inconsistent to the exasperation of his aides and advisers, often unbriefable, utterly casual over detail… And so on and so forth. He was a vortex of chaos, and No 10 became one as well without the kind of clear and consistent leadership that makes for an effective administration. The heart of government was, in fact, under Johnson, dysfunctional. It also argues that Cummings increasingly cut Johnson out of the decision-making process in his own government. It states that Cummings would tell officials and ministers: “Don’t tell the PM” or “Oh, don’t bother him with this”. The book claims it eventually led to the extraordinary outburst from Johnson: “I am meant to be in control. I am the führer. I’m the king who takes the decisions.” In another of his roles, Seldon has been tasked with examining how institutional competence and trust might be re-established. He has recently become deputy chair of something called the Commission on the Centre of Government, created by the Institute for Government, which will recommend steps to improve the workings of the Cabinet Office and No 10, post-pandemic and Brexit and Johnson and Cummings. I think that Johnson and Cummings were what was needed to bring the country to its senses,” he suggests. “People didn’t want things broken up. They wanted to be listened to. They wanted institutions that were more relevant to them. They felt excluded by metropolitan elite. Nobody is happy with what has happened.”

People we spoke to were afraid of Cummings, personal fear,” he says. “And to an extent of the whole Johnson court. In the seven books I’ve written, we saw some fear of some of the people around Gordon Brown, but this was off the scale. And that’s a deeply unhealthy facet of modern government that you let in people who are using fear as a method of control. Quite a lot of that was misogynistic in what we saw.” Secondly, it refutes the dangerous myth that Boris Johnson was foiled by a remainer establishment, rather than his own incompetence. His former chief of staff Eddie Lister declares that there is “no evidence that the civil service impeded the delivery of Brexit” and the authors conclude that if Johnson didn’t always get what he wanted from Whitehall, that’s because he led it poorly.He was exceptional. . .. he was ‘exceptionally bad’ as commented by Jenny Jones on BBC Radio 4’s ‘Any Questions’ in July, 2022:

Boris Johnson and wife Carrie on their final day in Downing Street. Photograph: Adrian Dennis/AFP/Getty ImagesI recently read the excellent Chums: How A Tiny Caste of Oxford Tories Took Over The UK which covers (amongst other things) Boris Johnson's formative years at Eton and Oxford, which set the scene for his later life. It was therefore an excellent, if unintentional, personal sequel. On occasions he could show substance, a sense of the necessity of forensic attention to detail, and exhibit firm and purposeful chairmanship and focused hard work, but rarely and only when the subject matter had absorbed his interest. But, as the authors point out, occasional, unpredictable manifestations of these qualities are, in a Prime Minister, inadequate to ensure good government. Johnson remains, in the authors’ concluding words, a man ‘with the potential, the aspirations and the opportunity to be one of Britain’s great Prime Ministers. His unequivocal exclusion from that club can be laid at the feet of no one else, but himself.’ Ultimately he lied to himself. He was a man who could not cope with more than 3 slides of information, which he invariably forgot. The King of the World ended up without a horse and stranded by history. Covid proved him very wrong on that, though interestingly this account doesn’t pin the blame for the early mistakes made fully on Johnson. Neither does it allow him to take the credit for the thing he is proudest of, the vaccine programme, saying that this falls to Emily Lawson who actually put together the successful campaign. If Johnson understood more about classical philosophy, he’d have recognised that an antithesis – being against something – isn’t enough. The country now needs a synthesis from whichever party. The great prime ministers are healers and teachers. They need to be able to tell a story of where they have come from and to where they will lead us.”